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The Economic Well-Being of Older People in International Perspective: A Critical Review
Richard Disney and Edward Whitehouse
This paper surveys a dozen international comparative studies of poverty, income distribution and older people in industrialized countries using data up to the mid-1990s. It addresses a series of questions. At what level are the incomes of the elderly relative to the population as a whole? How has this changed over the past two decades? How many of the old are poor? How many of the poor are old? Are the oldest of the old poorer than younger pensioners are?
The results show that the incomes of older people are typically around 80 per cent of incomes of the whole population. This ratio has been increasing over the past two decades in most countries. Although there remain pockets of poverty among the elderly, the old are generally represented proportionally or under-represented among the poor.
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The economic well-being of older people in international perspective: a critical review
Richard Disney Edward Whitehouse
Industrialized countries have adopted a variety of retirement-income systems. How well do these different systems fare in ensuring that older people have the resources to maintain a decent standard of living? And how should we measure countries' success at achieving this goal?
The cross-national analysis of income distributions is a relatively recent research topic, and most studies in this area have focused on the distribution of income across the population as a whole. Nevertheless, it is possible to extract the results relevant to the economic position of older people, and we draw on a dozen such studies, typically covering the early and mid-1990s, to attempt a 'meta-analysis' of these questions.
The following sections look in turn at three standard measures of economic well-being. Section 1 compares the average incomes of households comprising older people with those of the population as a whole ('average replacement rates'). Since averages can disguise a range of differences, we also disaggregate replacement rates for pensioners by sex, age and marital status.
Section 2 concentrates on the bottom end of the income distribution. It asks:
relative to standard poverty benchmarks, how many of the old are poor? The next section asks the reverse question: how many of the poor are old? Answers to both are an essential input to anti-poverty and retirement-income policy. Section 4 considers how the relative incomes of older people have changed over time. Section 5 compares income-distribution outcomes and the features of retirement-income systems. Section 6 looks at broader concepts of command over resources beyond the standard measure of cash and near-cash incomes. Section 7 concludes.
An important caveat is necessary. The procedure of examining the current income of pensioners and comparing them with the incomes of current workers must be used with care. In a contribution-based system, today's pensions depend on past contributions, past earnings and indeed the past savings behavior of today's pensioners. They also depend on the past rules of the pension system, which have changed significantly in most countries in the last decades. These changes will affect the future pattern of pensioners' incomes, and so current pensions may not be a good guide to the future. Note that the most recent data underlying the different studies are from the mid-1990s. Thus, recent policy reforms are not reflected in the results.
The relative incomes of older people
The simplest measure of the relative economic well-being of older people is to compare their average incomes with those of the population as a whole. Figure 1 shows the results of the latest income-distribution analysis compiled by the OECD on the basis of contributions from national experts.
In this study, older people are defined as individuals over 65. Incomes are measured on a household basis. They are adjusted for household size using an 'equivalence scale'. Individual equivalent income is here defined as the household income divided by the square root of the number of household members. (See Buhmann et al., 1988 and Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995 for a discussion of equivalization in a cross-national context.) Since older people tend to live in smaller households, this adjustment boosts the measured economic well-being of older people relative to the population as a whole. Income comprises earnings, public transfers, investment incomes, private pensions etc. It excludes capital gains and incomes in kind (from public provision of health care, for example).
Averaging across the 15 countries, older people's equivalent incomes are 83 per cent of those of the population as a whole. Interpreting this average is quite difficult for a number of reasons. For example, people no longer face the costs of work (commuting, special clothing etc.) when they are retired. A replacement rate of 100 per cent would therefore probably reflect a sizeable increase in living standards relative to the working life.
Younger pensioners may also derive utility from increased leisure time, particularly if the requirements of their pre-retirement job prevented them from adjusting working hours to optimize the trade-off between work and leisure. Increased leisure time also provides opportunities for home production (home improvement, cookery, gardening etc.) that might not have been possible before retirement. These additions to utility are not measured in conventional distributional studies.
Another important issue is the pattern of marginal utility of income with age. For example, the very elderly may be unable to enjoy expensive leisure pursuits. However, they may have large health and care costs, which are not taken into account. Morbidity rates are much higher for older people than for the working-age population and the costs of disability are recognized in benefit systems. In the United Kingdom, for example, recipients of disability benefits are much less likely to be in the lowest quintile of the population income distribution (13 per cent) than pensioners as a whole (27 per cent), because of their extra benefit entitlement (Department of Social Security, 2000b, Table 7 .5).
Nevertheless, it is not possible to adjust incomes for the extra cost of disability and so there is a danger in overstating the purchasing power of the disabled. The results of replacement rates for married couples can be compared directly among three studies. The pair-wise correlation coefficients vary between 0.2 and 0.6 and none is statistically significant. Mean replacement rates also vary widely. Similarly, the results for two studies that allow us to separate out the replacement rate for single pensioners provide unrelated results.
The most convincing explanation for the patterns of incomes by sex and marital status is the difference in structure of social-security (public-pension) benefits. For example, most continental European systems base the amount of social security wholly on contribution and earnings (see the descriptions of pension systems in section 5 below and in OECD, 2001 and Whitehouse, 2002a,b) . A consequence is that the equivalised incomes for married couples where one partner has an incomplete contribution history are lower than for single pensioners. But the flat-benefit systems of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (and the means-tested system in Australia) pay a higher benefit to married couples where one partner (usually the wife in the case of these cohorts) has accumulated little or no pension rights of her own. This means that replacement rates for single pensioners are much closer to those of married couples than they are in other countries.
Other features of retirement-income systems also have an effect on the pattern of incomes by sex and marital status.
Living arrangements
Disney and Johnson (2001) poverty are quite sensitive to the choice of unit: typically, the smaller the unit of measurement, the larger is measured poverty and inequality. Goodman, Johnson and Webb (1997) , for example, report that using the family unit in the United Kingdom would increase the proportion of the population with incomes below half the average by a third compared with household-based measures.
The effect will also vary between countries because of significant differences in the living arrangements of older people. Table 1 shows the proportions of the elderly living with their children. These are high in Japan and southern Europe and very low in the Nordic countries and the Netherlands. In most countries, there has been a substantial decline in co-residence over time. In the United Kingdom, for example, a third of the elderly lived with their children in the early 1960s, twice today's level. 1987 Source: OECD (1994 OECD (2001) benefit is determined by their past earnings, which will be higher for younger cohorts, who tend to have had higher real lifetime incomes than their predecessors.
ii) Incomplete indexation of past pension benefits to inflation (especially private pensions and annuities).
iii) Women live longer than men so older pensioners are disproportionately female. Older women tend to be poorer than older men are. However, there is one counteracting factor: differential mortality of pensioners across income groups. Survivors to old ages will typically have greater financial, housing and pension wealth than pensioners who die young will. This composition effect means that older pensioners tend to be the richer of their cohort. Following pensioner incomes across time allows some of the cohort effect to be disentangled from the age effect. Johnson and Stears (1995) find that the average income of each cohort in the United Kingdom in fact increases over time. Differential mortality offsets clear evidence of cohort effects, under-indexation of pension benefits and decumulation of assets.
Australia has the reverse pattern to other countries: older pensioners are richer than younger ones. This probably stems from two unique features of the Australian retirement-income system (on which see Bateman, Kingston and Piggott, 2001 ). First, most private pension benefits are paid as lump sums. Such lump sums are not counted as income (see section 6). Secondly, the age pension (the public pension benefit) is both
income-and asset-tested. This encourages people to dissipate private-pension assets into housing, consumer durables etc., which do not reduce the age-pension entitlement. Table 4 .2 Note: data are mainly from between 1995 and 1997, with the exceptions of Germany (1993) and the Netherlands (1993-94) The following tables examine pair-wise the correlation of replacement rate rankings across countries for studies that divide replacement rates by age group. There is a further split because Hauser reports results using 'old'-and 'new-OECD' equivalence scales (in his terminology). The first line in each cell shows the correlation coefficient between the replacement rates reported for each overlapping country in the relevant two studies. The significance level, from a standard test, is reported in parentheses. The second line in each cell reports the mean respective replacement rate in the two studies that are compared. Comparing the two results from Hauser, the results are highly correlated between countries but the mean replacement rate shifts substantially. The correlations between the OECD studies for the 65-74 age group (Table 3) are fairly close, but there is much greater disparity in the findings of the five studies in Table 4 for older pensioners. Although the means are similar, the correlations are lower, indicating that the rankings of countries by average replacement rates vary significantly across countries. 
2.
Income-poverty rates 'Poverty' is a very broad concept and the many dimensions of social exclusion and deprivation can only be captured with a range of indicators. Our focus here is on income as a definition of well-being. We therefore use the term 'poverty' as shorthand for low income while acknowledging that low income as a single measure does not capture all the facets of poverty and deprivation.
There are two basic approaches to defining poverty:
• An absolute standard: either the resources to meet basic needs or to reach the safety-net income specified by the social-assistance system; and
• A relative standard, where poverty is defined in comparison with the living standards of society as a whole.
Over the long term, governments have tended to increase the safety-net level of income faster than prices, implying that societies' (or at least governments') views of poverty changes over time. Absolute poverty standards are problematic for international comparisons since:
• Basic needs differ between countries;
• The poverty line must be translated into different currencies: market currency rates are very volatile and even purchasing power parities -which compare the cost of a common consumption basket -are inappropriate, because they aim to equalize the cost of total domestic expenditure and not the consumption of the poor; and
• Countries' average incomes differ. For example, poverty rates measured against a threshold of 50 per cent of average consumption across the European Union varied from under five per cent in Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands to nearly 70 per cent in Portugal (Eurostat, 1990) .
The most common measure of poverty in international studies is therefore the proportion of the population with incomes below some ratio of the average (mean or median) income. Two of the studies surveyed here define poor older people as those in the bottom fifth of the overall income distribution (a definition which obviously makes no sense when comparing aggregate poverty rates). Figure 4 shows the results from one of these (Johnson, 1998) Source: Burniaux et al. (1998) , Table 5 .3 Note: data are from 1993 to 1995 with the exception of France (1990) One possible explanation is the Nordic countries' relatively egalitarian distribution of income among the population as a whole compared, for example, with the United
States. The ratio of the value of the twentieth percentile of the income distribution to the median and the mean income in some example countries (from Förster and Pellizzari, 2000, Table 2 .2) illustrates these differences.
Sweden
United Kingdom United States P20/median 68% 61% 53% P20/mean 62% 51% 43%
Therefore, while many more pensioners in Denmark are found in the bottom quintile of the income distribution, their incomes will be higher as a proportion of the population average than low-income pensioners in the United States.
Comparing the data in Figure 5 with Figure 4 , the correlation coefficient is -0.08.
Measured income poverty rates for the six common countries are completely unrelated between these two studies (which use the bottom quintile of the overall income distribution as a measure of income poverty).
The remaining studies define income poverty as having an income below half of the population average income. This measure is more robust with respect to changes in the shape of the overall income distribution than the bottom-quintile measure. For example, a higher proportion in the bottom quintile of a more equal income distribution might generate higher measured poverty. However, this might mean that pensioners are relatively better off than their counterparts in a country with a more dispersed distribution of income. The final difference is in the average used. Hauser (1997) uses the mean while others use the median. The mean, of course, leaves the results vulnerable to the effect of outliers and measurement error and produces a higher threshold in countries with a more dispersed overall income distribution. Figure 7 uses the results of the latest OECD study of income distribution. The average income-poverty rate in this case is 13.9 per cent. These two studies produce quite similar results. The correlation between these two sets of results is close (0.76, significance level 0.00: see Table 5 ). The largest difference is in the poverty rate for Australia, which is reported as 16.1 per cent by Förster and Pellizzari and 29.4 per cent by Smeeding and
Williamson.
An income-poverty threshold of half-average income has become something of a standard, but the relative position of different countries can be sensitive to the choice of poverty line. Many studies, recognizing this, provide results with different cut-off points.
Comparison of these analyses is unfortunately hampered by the use of different thresholds:
for example, Source: Hauser (1997) , Table 7 Note data are from between 1989 and 1992, with the exception of Greece (1987-88) Finally, Table 5 compares the cross-country correlations of poverty rankings over pair-wise comparisons for the six studies that define poverty as having an income below half the average that were presented in the charts above. Five of these analyses are based on the Luxembourg Income Study, the exception being Förster and Pellizzari (2000) .
In general, the six papers give similar results. The correlation coefficients for poverty rate rankings across countries are positive and relatively high: some are significant on standard tests. Moreover, mean poverty rates in the countries that change rankings tend to be similar. The income-poverty rate in the United States lies between 20.3 and 25.3 per cent in different studies, but other countries show much more variation.
Most significant is the United Kingdom. Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding and
Whiteford and Kennedy report one of the lowest poverty rates for the United Kingdom: the third and fourth lowest respectively (at seven and eight per cent). In contrast, Bradshaw and Chen and Hauser suggest a very high poverty rate among British pensioners (36 and 23 per cent respectively). In the former case, we suspect that the main reason for this result is the exclusion of housing benefit from the measure of income. (The authors are not transparent, but they state on page four: 'Excluded from consideration here are the impacts of housing benefits and subsidies…') This treatment is unique to the BradshawChen study; all the other papers surveyed define income as all cash income and 'near-cash' income, where the latter specifically includes, for example, housing benefit in the United Kingdom and food stamps in the United States. Given the importance of housing benefits to poorer pensioners in the United Kingdom -some 17 per cent of all pensioners receive the benefit -it is unsurprising that this treatment has a significant effect on measured poverty rates.
The main idiosyncrasy of the Hauser paper is in the definition of a pensioner: all members (irrespective of their own age) of households headed by someone aged 55 or over in which one or more member receives a pension. The other studies simply count people as elderly using a standard cut-off age and do not count other members of households that contain a pensioner. There are many different effects of this treatment and so it is difficult to isolate which might be responsible for the rather different result for the United 
Income-poverty shares
A second, complementary presentation of income-poverty data looks at the proportion of the poor who are elderly, rather than the proportion of older people who are poor (as in the income-poverty rates above). The pensioner poverty share is closely related to the pensioner poverty rate, but it also depends on the older people's share of the population as a whole and on the overall poverty rate.
From the four studies surveyed here that report measures of poverty shares, we present detailed results from the most recent -Förster and Pellizzari (2000) -in The poverty share correlates well with the poverty rate from the same study (correlation coefficient: 0.68, significance: 0.00). Nevertheless, there are some outliers.
The United States has a high pensioner poverty rate relative to its pensioner poverty share, reflecting the relatively high overall poverty rate. Denmark has the opposite: quite a low pensioner poverty rate but a high pensioner poverty share. This reflects both a low overall poverty rate and the high pensioner population share (15.6 per cent, compared with an average of 13 per cent for all the countries). 
Income trends
The previous sections provide 'snapshots' of pensioners' incomes across countries in a single year. We can extend the analysis to look at how these patterns have changed over time. Förster and Pellizzari (2000) provide a broad analysis of the trend in the relative incomes of older people. The data compare the mid-1990s with the mid-1980s. Table 7 gives the results as the percentage change in the replacement rate over the decade or so.
Pensioners' incomes increased faster than the whole population's did in nine of the 13 countries. The mean change is a two per cent increase in the replacement rate. Older people in Canada, France, Germany and the United Kingdom enjoyed large gains with increases of over five per cent in the replacement rate. The sizeable decline in pensioners' relative incomes in Ireland is probably a reflection of the rapid growth of the economy, which has seen large increases in earnings. Income changes in virtually all the countries vary significantly between the two age groups of 'younger' and 'older' pensioners. In nine of the 13 nations, gains are larger for younger pensioners than for the over 75s; in several countries significantly so. This may arise from the growth of private benefits, real wage growth (affecting incremental replacement rates) and other cohort effects.
5.
Income-distribution outcomes and the structure pension systems
We began the paper by observing that industrialized countries have very different pension systems. We have then shown that there is much less variation in retirement-income outcomes than such structural differences might imply. The OECD (2001) has described this result as 'convergent outcomes, divergent means'. In Italy, the public pension scheme has a high ceiling. It is designed to achieve a great degree of earnings replacement, even for high-income workers. A similar effect is achieved by the statutory occupational pension system in Finland and the quasi-mandatory occupational schemes in the Netherlands and Sweden. The Dutch and Finnish systems have no ceiling to benefits; in Sweden, the ceiling is very high. Korea's severance pay scheme also has no ceiling. In these countries, there is some additional protection for lowincome workers, but over much of the income range, projected pension values are linear.
At the other end of the spectrum, the philosophy of the Canadian and British systems is very different. These systems are more redistributive. They ensure that all pensioners achieve a basic standard of living rather than aiming to give everyone a certain level of earnings replacement. This has led to development of extensive voluntary private coverage, particularly among higher-income workers. Both countries have mandatory earnings-related public schemes, but these have low ceilings and relatively low accrual rates. Six countries make up an intermediate group. In Germany and the United States, the public pension systems have a redistributive formula, giving higher replacement rates to lower-income workers. Australia and Switzerland have systems of mandatory contributions to private pension plans at quite low levels along with sizeable basic pension programs.
The two-tier Japanese public scheme is similarly redistributive.
The reason why these substantially different statutory pension systems deliver similar outcomes lies in voluntary provision of retirement incomes. In particular, the more redistributive public schemes leave space for the development of private plans for middleand high-income workers. This is illustrated in Figure 11 , which shows the proportion of income deriving from the state (pensions and other benefits). Countries are ranked by the overall average proportion of older people's income from state sources. Unsurprisingly, poorer pensioners everywhere rely on the state for the vast majority of their income. The comprehensive social-insurance schemes in France, Germany and Italy mean that the richest pensioners still get the majority of their income from the state. Indeed, the proportion in France and Italy is only slightly below the proportion for the bottom income quintile. In the other countries, there are predominantly flat-rate public pension systems, or earnings-related public schemes with highly progressive formulae. In Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, only around a fifth of the income of the richest quintile of the elderly derives from public pension programs. 
Income concepts
The data underlying the results surveyed here are based on similar concepts of income. This comprises earnings, public transfers, investment incomes, private pensions etc. Typically, the studies exclude all (or at least some kinds of) capital gains, because the receipt of a capital gain in a particular period reflects the accrual of gains over the period an asset was held. Including such gains would artificially broaden the income distribution.
Incomes in kind are also excluded, as are lump-sum distributions from private pensions.
This raises significant questions concerning the definition of economic well-being and, in particular, the treatment of financial assets and housing wealth. This is particularly pertinent for pensioners who are (or should be, according to the standard lifecycle hypothesis of consumption) dis-saving at this point in their life.
Capital income and financial wealth
The standard 'statistical' measure of income used in distributional analyses differs from a desirable 'economic' measure. The Haig-Simons (economic) definition is the change in net economic wealth between two points in time plus consumption in that period. Hicks (1946) defines income as 'the maximum amount of money which the individual can spend this week, and still expect to be able to spend the same amount in real terms in each ensuing week'. The difference between the two relates to non-recurring sources of income.
The standard statistical measure is an approximation to the economic definition, but it differs in two important respects. First, it ignores capital gains. Secondly, it does not take account of the effect of inflation. It makes little sense to say that income is the amount one can spend in a period leaving the nominal rather than the real value of wealth
intact. Yet, the standard measure typically includes nominal capital income.
To illustrate, pensioners' investment incomes fell by nearly a fifth between 1992
and 1994-95. But during this period, interest rates fell from 15 per cent to less than half that level and inflation fell from a peak of nearly 11 per cent to less than three per cent, leaving real interest rates fairly stable. This implies that the measured decline in the level of investment incomes overstates the change in economic income according to the Hicksian criterion. It would not be possible to spend nominal interest income without reducing the real value of wealth. There are similar distortions in comparisons between countries with different inflation rates.
The Hicksian definition has one undesirable characteristic: it assumes that people's command over resources is limited such that the current stock of wealth is left when they die. (The Hicksian definition underlies the permanent income hypothesis of consumption and saving behavior, which explicitly assumes that people have infinite lives.) However, it is reasonable to suggest that pensioners might finance some of their consumption from running down their wealth. This process is automatic in pension schemes that provide annuities (that is, all public and most private plans). The payment stops when the beneficiaries die and net wealth in the scheme is then obviously zero.
Most other assets, however, are not in the form of annuities, and it may be that the decision to hold part of wealth not in the form of annuities arises from some form of bequest motive. Nevertheless, the stock of wealth represents command over resources that a pensioner could spend if she or he so wanted. Moreover, if bequests are altruistic, then presumably elderly donors derive some utility from the knowledge that their pet charity or relative will benefit after they have passed on. If bequests are strategic, then pensioners enjoy some non-pecuniary return (Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985) .
This invites a comprehensive measure of command over resources that asks: 'how much can people safely spend in a period and expect to have net wealth of zero when they die?' More formally, this measure can be defined as the sum of non-capital income plus initial period wealth times the annuity rate. To examine how this affects income at each age, we utilize age and sex-specific annuity rates to construct an annuity value of wealth (see Disney and Whitehouse, 2001, pp. 75-78 for full details). Data on average holdings of financial assets from a number of countries are drawn from Disney, Mira d'Ercole and Scherer (1998) . Table 8 shows wealth as a ratio to income in the first four columns, split by marital type and between pensioners and older workers. Among the pensioner units, the wealthto-income ratio is the highest in Australia: single pensioners have assets worth over six times their income; couples, five times. The average across all the countries shown is around 2.5 for both single pensioners and couples, with Japan and the United States also showing high levels of wealth relative to income. The final two columns indicate the effect of including the annuity value of wealth in the income measure. This increase at age 67 is the annuity rate at that age (7.8 per cent) less the return on assets already counted as income (which we have arbitrarily taken as five per cent). The average change is a seven per cent increase in pensioners' command over resources, with significant variation between countries. For example, Australia has a relatively low pension replacement rate but high wealth-to-income ratios, so a broader concept of command over resources puts it closer to other countries. Partly because of fiscal incentives and partly for historical and cultural reasons, most occupational pensions in Australia are drawn as lump sums rather than an annuity. Australian pensioners clearly must finance their consumption by running down their assets: a form of self-provision of an annuity. Compare this with another country, the United Kingdom, say, where most occupational-pension benefits have to be taken as an annuity. Income would be higher and asset holdings lower on standard measures even if the economic position of older people in the two countries were the same. The measure of comprehensive command over resources equalizes the treatment of these two different systems of pension provision. Crystal and Shea (1990) performed a similar exercise on United States data, which showed an increase in the measured replacement rate for older people from 103 to 124 per cent once the annuity value of wealth was taken into account. Table 9 Note: data are from between 1992 and 1995, with the exceptions of the United Kingdom (1988-89) and the Netherlands (1990) 
Housing
Many pensioners have a far more valuable asset than their financial wealth in the shape of their own home. Indeed, for many older households housing wealth is the major asset other than social-security or private-pension wealth. Owner occupation yields a flow of services that should, in principle, be treated as an income flow, usually called an 'imputed rent'. Table 10 shows estimates of the value of housing wealth relative to income in a range of countries. Housing wealth is generally much larger for people over retirement age than it is for people of working age. High property prices in Japan and the value placed on home ownership mean that housing wealth is particularly significant there.
The 'asset-rich, income-poor' phenomenon that has exercised some commentators seems particularly pertinent with housing wealth, especially where the tax (and means-test) treatment of retirement-income streams invites individuals to hold their assets in the form of housing. Nevertheless, there are difficulties in simply treating housing as wealth that could be potentially annuitised. Housing is also a consumption good and pensioners are often reluctant to move from their family home (Venti and Wise, 1990; Megbolugbe, Sa-Aadu and Shilling, 1999) . Housing wealth may prove a constraint on current living standards rather than simply a source of additional imputed income.
Nevertheless, it would be useful to know what is the annuity value of this housing wealth, and how its use would affect the incomes of pensioners and the poverty rates among pensioner households. Hancock (1998) However, converting housing equity into an annuity implies the existence of a competitive and secure equity-release sector. But this market has remained rather thin in both the United Kingdom and elsewhere.
The most common form of equity release practised by older households is therefore through downsizing and changes in tenure status. A number of studies have examined the relationship between house moves and 'excess' housing costs, measured in either physical units or monetary terms. The presumption is that moves are more likely where the house is 'inappropriate' to the size of the family or when there are changes in economic status (such as retirement). The results of these studies are mixed. Ermisch and Jenkins (1999) find some evidence that retired people in the United Kingdom who move do physically reduce their living space. Evidence from the United States shows that some households move to rented accommodation after retirement as a way of releasing housing equity for consumption (see, for example, Feinstein and McFadden, 1989) . But in the United Kingdom, more older households switched from rental to owner occupation than made the reverse move in the late 1980s, perhaps because of 'right-to-buy' policies in local authority housing. Moreover, Disney, Henley and Stears (2002) find no evidence that 'excess' housing budget shares, relative to income, were associated with household moves in the late 1980s. This was perhaps because this was a period of falling house prices that induced elderly households to 'sit tight'. However, that paper does show that moving by elderly households was associated with an increase in financial assets, indicating some evidence of 'equity release' as a motive for moving.
Cross-country comparisons of the value of housing equity (Smeeding et al., 1993; Whiteford and Kennedy, 1995) suffer from two main problems. First, they combine the value of direct subsidies to social rented housing with the value of home-owners' equity.
Although both of these relate to housing, they are very different economic issues.
Secondly, the data are far from ideal. In most cases, the value of housing equity has to be imputed from a different dataset and matched into the Luxembourg Income Study by age and income. People are then simply assumed to earn a fixed rate of return on the value of housing equity.
Housing wealth is an important determinant of the standard of living for many older households: its use, for example, could reduce significantly measured poverty among very elderly households outside the poorest quintile. Nevertheless, the equity-release market is thin. The evidence that pensioner households use house moves to release equity is strong, but many elderly households are reluctant to move at all, even when they have high potential values of housing equity. Large houses (relative to income) are both a blessing and a curse.
Conclusions
This paper has surveyed the results of a dozen recent papers on the relative living standards of older people in a number of OECD countries. The main findings are:
• Average pensioner incomes range from 73 per cent of average population incomes in Denmark to over 90 per cent in Canada and the United States (the 'replacement rate').
Allowing for travel-to-work and other costs, and adjusting for differences in family size and composition, pensioners probably have a similar standard of living to their younger counterparts.
• Single women pensioners tend to be worse off than couples, especially if they live alone. Living arrangements differ widely.
• Younger pensioners generally have higher incomes than older pensioners, except in Australia, where the age pension is means-tested and private pensions are mostly taken as lump sums.
• Correlations of cross country rankings of replacement ratios across countries show positive, but not always significant coefficients. Different data sets, methodologies and time periods give different results.
• There is disagreement across studies as to what fraction of pensioners are 'poor', and how these rankings differ across countries. The rankings are sensitive to where the poverty line is set. Another important determinant of the poverty rate is the degree of inequality of incomes of the working population.
• Replacement rates for pensioners increased between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s
in most countries, with younger pensioners faring better than older pensioners. Again, however, several countries go against the trend.
• 'Income' in these studies typically comprises income from earnings, pensions (both public and private) and investment income. But many pensioners have other forms of wealth, notably financial and housing wealth. Pensioner households can spend more than they receive by drawing down ('annuitizing') this wealth.
• Many older households, however, do not run down their wealth, either by choice (for example, a bequest motive) or because it is illiquid (home ownership). Should the annuity value of this wealth be added to measured income in assessing pensioner wellbeing? We illustrated the range of impacts to measured income that arise from incorporating the annuitised value of wealth into the calculations and discussed some practical issues that arise when pensioner households try to adopt such a strategy.
Future work might exploit data sets that track individuals over time. At present, few studies consider whether pensioner poverty is persistent, although longitudinal data sets such as the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) and AHEAD are increasingly been used for this purpose in the United States. Such data sets are expensive to collect and assimilate, and European countries have been slow to follow the American lead. However the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) offers data collected on a comparable basis for a range of EU countries that has not been exploited to a great extent (Nicoletti and Peracchi, 2001) .
A potentially exciting innovation arises from panel studies that are being developed or already 'in the field' that collected data both on the economic and health status of panels of households close to or after retirement age. Surveys such as the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA) and the Survey of Health and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) are now underway. These studies, closely matching HRS and AHEAD in the US, should permit more sophisticated comparable analyses of the dynamic determinants of well-being of older people, matching economic measures of 'well-being' to underlying measures of morbidity, disability and general health. The goals of greater understanding of the evolution of well-being of older households, and the potential for genuinely interdisciplinary research, will be greatly enhanced by these developments.
